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A STEP FORWARD FOR THE CONSUMER:
A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT-TO-KNOW
IN PRESCRIPTION DRUG PRICE
ADVERTISING
Consumerism' is on the rise in the United States.2 The success of the
consumer movement stems in part from the concerted activities of
persons who have asserted their rights to the free flow of information
premised upon the first amendment right to know.3 The movement's
success is evident in both recent legislation4 and court decisions 5 recog-
nizing and upholding the consumer's right to access of information.
Traditionally, however, legislative 6 and judicial7 restraints, particu-
1. Consumerism has been defined as private and public activities of consumers "to
inprove their relative positions vis-a-vis the suppliers and manufacturers of consumer
goods." Conserned Consumers League v. O'Neill, 371 F. Supp. 644 (E.D. Wis. 1974).
2. See generally D. ROTHSCHILD & D. CARROLL, CONSUMER PROTECTION: TEXT AND
MATERIALS (1973).
The work of the Ralph Nader Study Group attests to the public's increasing concern in
matters relevant to the consumer. See, e.g., D. BARNEY, THE LAST STAND: RALPH
NADER'S STUDY GROUP REPORT ON THE NATURAL FORESTS (1974); CORPORATE POWER IN
AMERICA (R. Nader & M. Green eds. 1973); R. FELLMETH, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE
OMISSION (1970); WHISTLE BLOWING (R. Nader, P. Petkas & K. Blackwell eds. 1972).
3. See, e.g. Terminal-Hudson Elec. v. Department of Consumer Affairs, 407 F.
Supp. 1075 (C.D. Cal.), vacated and remanded sub nom. Board of Optometry v.
California Citizens Action Group, 96 S. Ct. 2619 (1976) (state statute prohibiting adver-
tising of prices & places to buy corrective eyeglasses is an unconstitutional infringement
of consumers' first amendment rights to receive such information); Terry v. California
State Bd. of Pharmacy, 395 F. Supp. 94 (N.D. Cal. 1975), aff'd, 96 S. Ct. 2617 (1976)
(state statute prohibiting media advertising of prescription drug prices violated first
amendment rights of consumers seeking such information); Concerned Consumers
League v. O'Neill, 371 F. Supp. 644 (E.D. Wis. 1974) (consumer group's informational
picketing about business practices is protected by the first amendment).
4. See, e.g., Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1677 (1970). This Act requires
that creditors extending consumer credit disclose essential credit terms before the credit
is extended. This Act also includes disclosure in advertising as well as party-to-party
transactions. See also Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681t (1970). This
Act regulates the contents and confidentiality of the reports of consumer reporting
agencies and provides for consumer access to such reports. For a general discussion of
numerous other federal statutes that directly affect consumer transactions see D.
ROTHSCHILD & D. CARROLL, CONSUMER PROTECTION REPORTING SERVICE (1973). Con-
sumer protection statutes (with varying provisions) have been enacted in many states.
5. See note 3 supra.
6. State statutes with respect to prescription drugs exemplify such restrictions. Eight
states currently restrict the disclosure of prescription drug prices by statute. See ALASKA
STAT. § 8.80.420(b) (Supp. 1972); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-175A (Supp. 1975); FLA
STAT. ANN. § 465.23 (West Supp. 1973) (this statute has been repealed effective 1978);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37:1225(11) (West 1965); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:14-12(c) (West
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larly the commercial speech doctrine,8 have limited the scope 9 of the
consumer's right to know. The United States Supreme Court in Vir-
ginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc.' 0 dealt directly with the conflict between statutory restrictions on
commercial speech and the consumer's right to know. In Virginia State
Board, the Court recognized that the public has a constitutionally
protected interest in the free flow of commercial information and held
that a state may not, consistent with the first amendment, prohibit
pharmacists from advertising the prices of prescription drugs.
Plaintiffs in Virginia State Board, a state resident 2 and two non-
profit state organizations, 3 were consumers of prescription drugs in
Virginia. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief' 4 against en-
forcement of a Virginia statute 5 which made it unprofessional conduct
Supp. 1972-73); N.D. CENT. CODE § 43-15-10(1)(b) (1960); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59 §
736.1 (West 1972); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4542(a), § 17(d)(3) (Vernon 1960).
7. Cf., Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (municipal ordinance forbidding the use
or operation on public streets of sound trucks does not violate first amendment). In
Kovacs, the Court stated that "[clity streets are recognized as a normal place for the
exchange of ideas by speech. . . . But this does not mean the freedom is beyond all
control." Id. at 87.
8. Commercial speech "means a communication concerned solely with promoting
the sale of commercial services or products, which services or products are themselves
not speech traditionally protected by the first amendment." Redish, The First Amend-
ment in the Marketplace: Commercial Speech and the Values of Free Expression, 39 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 429, 432 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Redish]. For a general discussion of
the commercial speech doctrine, its history and subsequent application, see Note, The
Commercial Speech Doctrine: The First Amendment at a Discount, 41 BROOKLYN L.
REV. 60 (1974).
9. See notes 26-35 and accompanying text infra.
10. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
11. Id. at 770.
12. Plaintiff-appellee Lynn B. Jordan suffers from certain diseases which require her
to take prescription drugs on a daily basis. Brief for Appellees at 8, Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Virginia State Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
13. Plaintiff-appellee Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., is a nonprofit, non-
partisan, volunteer organization, many of whose members are users of prescription
drugs. Plaintiff-appellee Virginia State AFL-CIO is an unincorporated, nonprofit labor
organization with approximately 69,000 members who are residents of Virginia, many of
whom are users of prescription drugs. Id.
14. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides a right of action for deprivation of federal civil
rights.
15. VA. CODE § 54-524.35 (1974) provides that:
Any pharmacist shall be considered guilty of unprofessional conduct who. . . . (3)
publishes, advertises or promotes, directly or indirectly, in any manner what-
soever, any amount, price, fee, premium, discount, rebate or credit terms for
professional services or for drugs containing narcotics or for any drugs which may
be dispensed only by prescription.
[Vol. 13:179
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for a licensed Virginia pharmacist to advertise prescription drug prices.
Plaintiffs alleged that the statute, in effect, deprived them of price
information necessary to make a knowledgeable choice in purchasing
prescription drugs. Plaintiffs contended that the first amendment se-
cured their right to receive the information, independent of the phar-
macists' right to disseminate the prices. In their view, given a willing
speaker, constitutional protection extended to the source and the re-
cipients of information. t6 The advertising ban substantially infringed
recipients' rights.
Accepting this argument, a three-judge federal district court 7 held
the state statute unconstitutional as a denial of the consumer's right to
know.1 8 The Supreme Court affirmed and concluded that although the
state has a legitimate interest in regulating the professional standards
of its pharmacists, consumers have a superior interest in their right to
information regarding the prices of prescription drugs. 9
The free flow of information is central to the preservation of the
public's right to know. 20 The first amendment guaranty of freedom of
speech includes, not only the right to speak, but the right to receive
information. 2t Traditionally, judicial protection of the right to know
16. The plaintiffs did not claim that their first amendment right to receive the
information implied a correlative right for them to compel the pharmacists to advertise.
Brief for the appellees at 10-11, Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
17. 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970) requires a three-judge court for the issuance of an
interlocutory or permanent injunction against enforcement of a state statute.
18. 373 F. Supp. 683, 687 (E.D. Va. 1974). The district court concluded that the
consumers' interest in access to the price information outweighed the interests of the
state in suppressing it. The enforcement of the ban did not promote public health. "[O]n
the contrary, access by the infirm or poor to the price of prescription drugs would be for
their good." Id.
19. 425 U.S. at 769-70.
20. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 725-26 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting). Con-
cern for society's interest in the free flow of information underlies the first amendment
freedoms. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964); Smith v.
California, 361 U.S. 147, 155 (1959); Dejonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937);
Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936); Stromberg v. California, 283
U.S. 359, 369 (1931). See generally Ervin, Media and the First Amendment in a Free
Society, 60 GEO. L.J. 871 (1972); Note, Privacy in the First Amendment, 82 YALE L.J.
1462 (1973).
21. The writings of James Madison reflected this principle.
"A popular Government, without popular information, or the means of acquiring it,
is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or perhaps both. Knowledge will forever
govern ignorance. And a people who mean to be their own governors, must arm
themselves with the power knowledge gives."
Letter from James Madison to W. T. Barry, August 4, 1822, in 9 WRITINGS OF JAMES
MADISON 103 (G. Hunt ed. 1910) quoted in Comment, Freedom to Hear: A Political
Justification of the First Amendment, 46 WASH. L. REv. 311, (1971).
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and the free flow of information was limited to political speech.22
Courts have, however, recently recognized that freedom of discussion
"must embrace all issues about which information is needed or ap-
propriate to enable members of society to cope with the exigencies of
their period." '23 Thus many courts now hold that diverse matters of
general public interest merit first amendment protection. 24 Under this
Over the years, courts have recognized that first amendment protection extends to the
right to receive and know. See, e.g. , Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396,408-409 (1974)
("[Tihe addressee as well as the sender of direct personal correspondence derives from
the First. . . .Amendmen[t] a protection against unjustified governmental interference
with the intended communication."); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753,762-63 (1972)
(right to receive information recognized); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S.
367, 390 (1969) (right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic,
moral and other ideas); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (private possession
of obscene material is constitutionally protected); Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381
U.S. 301, 308 (1965) (U.S. citizens have constitutional right to receive foreign political
publications); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (constitutional right to
receive contraceptives); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 505 (1946) (citizens living in
company owned town have a right to receive literature; ordinance completely barring
distribution is unconstitutional); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 534 (1945) (union
members have a right to fully and freely discuss and be informed concerning union
membership); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943) (ordinance forbidding door-
to-door distribution of literature violates constitutional right to receive such literature).
See generally Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES (1941); A. MEIKLEJOHN,
FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (Ist ed. 1948).
22. Mr. Justice Brandeis, in his concurring opinion in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S.
357 (1927), stated:
Those who won our independence believe. . . that public discussion is a political
duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of the American government
.. . that the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed
grievances and proposed remedies ...
Id. at 375. See Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966) (first amendment protects expressions
in opposition to national foreign policy); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S, 75, 85 (1966)
(criticism of government is at the very center of free discussion); New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (national commitment to the principle that debate on
public issues be uninhibited). For a general discussion of the emphasis of political rights
embodied in the first amendment, see Comment, Freedom to Hear: A Political Justifica-
tion of the First Amendment, 46 WASH. L. REV. 311 (1972).
23. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940). See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S.
809, 820 (1975); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967).
24. See, e.g. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29 (1971) (radio's broadcast
reporting petitioner's arrest for possession of obscene literature is constitutionally per-
missible regardless of his subsequent acquittal); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S.
130 (1967) (news report of conspiracy to fix football game is a public issue and constitu-
tionally protected); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967) (publication of a review of a
play which related play to a true incident is protected); Anderson Clayton & Co. v.
Washington State Dep't of Agriculture, 402 F. Supp. 1253 (W.D. Wash. 1975) (use of
dairy terms in advertising margarine protected under the first amendment); Fur Informa-
tion & Fashion Council, Inc. v. E. F. Timme & Son, 364 F. Supp. 16 (S.D.N.Y. 1973),
aff'd, 501 F.2d 1048 (2d Cir. 1974) (artificial fur manufacturer's promotion of his
products as an alternative to the extinction of fur-bearing mammals is of general public
interest and constitutionally protected).
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rationale, consumer groups assert that the public has a right to know
and receive information necessary to the formulation of intelligent
economic decisions.25
In the past, however, commercial communications were not con-
stitutionally protected. The case law generally26 supported the view,
first enunciated in Valentine v. Chrestensen,27 that the Constitution
imposed no restraint on governmental regulation of commercial
speech. 28 Although some decisions extended first amendment protec-
25. See note 3 supra.
26. United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 211 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 934
(1972) (prohibition on newspaper's publishing of discriminatory rental house ads held
constitutional); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1306 (2d Cir.) cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1005, (1971) (in holding corporation's purchase of stock to be in violation of
Securities & Exchange Act, court stated that first amendment does not deal with
commercial speech); SEC v. Wall St. Transit Corp., 422 F.2d 1371, 1379-81 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 398 U.S. 958 (1970) (no constitutional conflict inherent in fact that invest-
ment advisory newspaper might be required to register under Investment Advisers Act);
New York State Broadcasters Ass'n v. United States, 414 F.2d 990, 996-97 (2d Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1061 (1970) (prohibition on broadcasting lottery ads does
not inhibit free speech); Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1101-02 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969) (FCC's authority to require media that carry cigarette ads to
devote equal time to presenting case against cigarette smoking is constitutional); Jenness
v. Forbes, 351 F. Supp. 88, 96-97 (D.R.I. 1972) (restrictions on commercial activities
within military housing areas are constitutional); Patterson Drug Co. v. Kingery, 305 F.
Supp. 821, 825 (W.D. Va. 1969) (state statute prohibiting pharmacists from advertising
the prices of prescription drugs is constitutional).
27. 316 U.S. 52 (1942), noted in 30 CALIF. L. REV. 655 (1942) and 8 OHIO ST. L.J. 331
(1942).
28. See note 8 supra. In Chrestensen, the owner of a submarine attempted to
circumvent a city ordinance forbidding street distribution of commercial and business
matter by printing a protest against this restriction on the reverse side of a handbill
soliciting visitors for the submarine for a stated admission fee. 316 U.S. at 52-53.
Reversing the lower court, the Supreme Court held that the municipal ordinance did not
abridge the first amendment even as applied to a commercial handbill with an attached
protest of a matter proper for public information. Id. at 54.
In the course of the opinion, the Court enunciated the commercial speech doctrine:
[T]he streets are the proper places for the exercise of the freedom of communicat-
ing information and disseminating opinion and . . . though the states and
municipalities may appropriately regulate the privilege in the public interest, they
may not unduly burden or proscribe its employment in these public thoroughfares.
We are equally clear that the Constitution imposes no such restraint on government
as respects purely commercial advertising.
Id. at 54 (emphasis added). The New York Court of Appeals recently held the ordinance
in question in Chrestensen unconstitutional. People v. Remeny, 40 N.Y.2d 527, 355
N.E.2d 375, 387 N.Y.S.2d 415 (1976).
Although courts frequently applied the commercial speech doctrine, the Chrestensen
decision was heavily criticized. Some commentators have asserted that the Court failed
to define the scope of the doctrine. See 1975 BRIGHAM YOUNG L. REV. 797, 799; 23
DEPAUL L. REV. 1258, 1262-63 (1974); 12 DUQ. L. REV. 1000, 1004-05 (1975); 12 URBAN
L. ANN. 221, 223-25 (1976). Others argued that the Court severed commercial speech
from the first amendment without relying on first amendment language or theory. See
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tion to certain communications of a commercial nature,29 the commer-
cial speech exception permitted statutory restrictions on dissemination
of information proposing "commercial transactions" to the
consumer.
30
The recent Supreme Court decision in Bigelow v. Virginia 31 set aside
much of the Chrestensen holding. 32 In Bigelow, the Court declared
Redish, supra note 8, at 429-30; 12 DuQ. L. REV. at 1005 (1975). Justice Douglas believed
that there was no constitutional justification for denying protection to commercial
speech. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Grove, 404 U.S. 898, 904-905 (1971) (Douglas, J.,
dissent to denial of cert.); Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513-15 (1959)
(Douglas, J., concurring). For a discussion of the view that commercial speech should be
protected under the first amendment see 23 DEPAUL L. REV. 1258 (1974).
Court efforts to delineate the limits of "purely commercial speech" resulted in the use
of three different standards. In Chrestensen, the Supreme Court used a primary purpose
test. 316 U.S. at 55. Under this approach, courts scrutinized the motive or intent of the
advertiser/distributor and refused to extend constitutional protection to publications
intended to convey commercial information. See Redish, supra note 8, at 451-52. For
cases which used the primary purpose standard to preclude first amendment protection
to commercial advertising, see note 26 supra. Over the years, however, courts carved
exceptions out of the primary purpose rationale and extended first amendment protec-
tion to certain communications with commercial qualities. See note 29 infra.
The second standard used by the courts was content oriented. See, e.g., Pittsburgh
Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973) (content
standard used to hold help-wanted ads to be commercial speech and subject to regula-
tion); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (content of political ad
precluded commercial speech classification). See also 42 TENN. L. REV. 573, 575 (1975).
Under content analysis, courts look beyond the commercial framework of the advertise-
ment and examine the content of the message. On a case by case basis, courts assess
whether the message expresses matters of social policy or political concern that are of
the highest public interest warranting first amendment protection. 1975 BRIGHAM YOUNG
L. REV. 797, 810; 23 DEPAUL L. REV. 1258, 1261 (1974).
The third approach to commercial speech employs a balancing standard. See note 34
and accompanying text infra.
29. See, e.g., Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975) (newspaper's publication of
abortion services advertisement was protected although profit motive involved); New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (newspaper's publication of political
advertisement was protected); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945) (labor organizer's
oral solicitations to recruit union members held constitutional even though a union was
considered to be a business activity and the recruiter was paid for his services); Jamison
v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943) (printed material concerning religious activity is not
subject to prohibition even though it is sold).
30. See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S.
376, 385 (1973).
31. 421 U.S. 809 (1975), noted in 1975 BRIGHAM YOUNG L. REV. 797; 42 TENN. L.
REV. 573 (1975); 10 U.RiCHMOND L. REV. 427 (1976); 12 URBAN L. ANN. 221 (1976).
32. The holding [in Chrestensen] is distinctly a limited one . . . . The fact that it
had the effect of banning a particular handbill does not mean that Chrestensen is
authority for the proposition that all statutes regulating commercial advertising are
immune from constitutional challenge. The case obviously does not support any
sweeping proposition that advertising is unprotected per se.
421 U.S. at 819-20 (emphasis in original). See People v. Remeny, 40 N.Y.2d 527, 355
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invalid a Virginia law 33 which, as applied, prohibited a Virginia news-
paper from publishing an advertisement for a New York abortion
referral service. The commercial nature of the advertisement did not
control the outcome as it did in Chrestensen. Through the use of a
balancing approach, the Court determined that the public's interest in
the information conveyed in the ad outweighed the governmental inter-
ests served by restriction.34 The decision left open, however, the
extent to which commercial speech of less interest to the public than
abortion referral might be regulated. 35 The Supreme Court, in Virginia
State Board,36 clarified the remaining doubts and extended first
amendment protection to pure commercial speech. 37
The use of first amendment theory by consumers in prescription
drug price advertising represents a new litigation approach. 38 Previous
N.E.2d 375, 387 N.Y.S.2d 415 (1976) (Fuchsberg, J., concurring); 1975 BRIGHAM YOUNG
L. REV. 797, 806-808.
33. 1960 Va. Acts ch. 385, § 18.1-63: "If any person, by publication, lecture, adver-
tisement, or in any other manner, encourage or prompt the procuring of abortion or
miscarriage, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." The state amended this statute shortly
after Bigelow's conviction and again after the Supreme Court decisiom VA. CODE §
18.2-76.1 (1975), amending VA. CODE § 18.1-63 (1972).
34. 421 U.S. at 821-26. "The advertisement in [Bigelow] did more than simply
propose a commercial transaction. It contained factual matter of a clear public interest."
Id. at 822.
In applying a balancing text, the Court weighs the public's interest in the free flow of
information against the governmental interest served by restrictive legislation. 12 DUQ.
L. REv. 1000, 1005 (1975). See Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728
(1970) (balancing approach used to uphold a statute which restricted the mailing of
unsolicited erotic material); Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Willingboro Twp., 535 F.2d 786,
cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 351 (1976) (balancing test used to uphold township ordinance
which barred the erection of "For Sale" and "Sold" signs on residential properties);
Terry v. California State Bd. of Pharmacy, 395 F. Supp. 94 (N.D. Cal. 1975), aff'd, 96 S.
Ct. 2617 (1976) (balancing test used to strike down statute banning prescription drug
price advertising); Unemployed Workers Union v. Hackett, 332 F. Supp. 1372 (D.R.I.
1971) (handbill informing unemployed persons about food stamps, welfare and unem-
ployment compensation was protected). See also Emerson, Toward a General Theory of
the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 908-16 (1963); 23 DEPAUL L. REV. 1258 (1974);
10 U. RICHMOND L. REV. 427, 430-33 (1976); 24 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 299, 303 (1967).
35. "We need not decide in this case the precise extent to which the First Amend-
ment permits regulation of advertising that is related to activities the State may legiti-
mately regulate or even prohibit." 421 U.S. at 825.
36. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
37. The Court identified the question before it as whether the communication "I will
sell you the X prescription drug at the Y price" is constitutionally protected. The Court
characterized this communication as purely commercial and determined that it merited
constitutional protection. Id. at 760-61, 770. In doing so, the Court did away with the
commercial speech exception to the first amendment. See People v. Remeny, 40 N.Y.2d
527, 355 N.E.2d 375, 387 N.Y.S.2d 415 (1976).
38. See notes 39, 40 and accompanying text infra. See generally 6 CuM. L. REV. 711,
714-21 (1976).
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challenges to similar statutes based on due process arguments by drug
companies and pharmacists have been dismissed 39 on the ground that
the regulations bore a reasonable relation to the state's interest in
protecting public health.40 When a first amendment theory is applied,
however, as in Virginia State Board, the state must demonstrate a
significant governmental interest 4' to justify such a restrictive
regulation.
Using the balancing approach, 42 the Court in Virginia State Board
determined that no significant governmental interest was served by
39. Due process challenges brought by drug retailers and pharmacists alleged that
statutes which prohibit prescription drug price advertising cause substantial loss in
business. Arguably the loss amounts to a taking of property without due process of law.
In addition, it has been contended that legislatures have not expressly determined that
such advertising would be deleterious to the public health or welfare.
Under this approach, due process claims asserted against bans on drug price advertis-
ing failed. Patterson Drug Co. v. Kingery, 305 F. Supp. 821 (W.D. Va. 1969); Milligan v.
Board of Pharmacy, 348 Mass. 492, 204 N.E. 2d 504 (1964); Supermarkets Gen. Corp. v.
Sills, 93 N.J. Super. 326, 225 A.2d 728 (Ch. 1966), noted in 24 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 299
(1967). Other courts, however, have struck down such legislation, finding the laws to
have little relation to public welfare. Florida Bd. of Pharmacy v. Webb's City, Inc., 219
So.2d 681 (Fla. 1969); Stadnik v. Shell's City, Inc., 140 So.2d 871 (Fla. 1962); Maryland
Bd. of Pharmacy v. Sav-A-Lot, Inc., 270 Md. 103, 311 A.2d 242 (1973); Pennsylvania
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Pastor, 441 Pa. 186, 272 A.2d 487 (1971), noted in 37 BRooKlyn
L. REv. 617 (1972).
40. Since the mid 1930's, courts have followed a restrictive approach to judicial
review of federal and state legislation. Courts have generally upheld government restric-
tions of economic activity if the restriction is reasonably related to a valid governmental
purpose. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) ("It is
enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the
particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct it."); Day-Brite Lighting,
Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952); Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236 (1941); West
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502
(1934).
41. See 425 U.S. at 771. Other Supreme Court decisions have phrased the standard as
a compelling state interest. E.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963). "The decisions
of this Court have consistently held that only a compelling state interest in the regulation
of a subject within the State's constitutional power to regulate can justify limiting First
Amendment freedoms." Id. at 438. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611-12
(1973); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972); Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381
U.S. 301, 307 (1965); Sheldon v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488-90 (1960); Talley v. Califor-
nia, 362 U.S. 60, 62-64 (1960).
42. See note 34 and accompanying text supra. The Court rejected the primary
purpose and content approaches. See note 28 supra. Regarding the "primary purpose"
approach the Court cited prior cases which indicated that speech in the form of a paid
advertisement or that which involves a solicitation to purchase does not lose first
amendment protection. 425 U.S. at 761. See note 29 supra. With respect to the "con-
tent" approach, the Court concluded that although the advertisement did not report on
any cultural, philosophical or political subject, purely factual matter of public interest
may claim constitutional protection. 425 U.S. at 761-62.
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prohibiting advertisement of prescription drug prices. In analyzing the
importance of the free flow of commercial information, the Court
regarded the interests asserted by plaintiffs as consumers43 to be
crucial. They suffered a direct harm from their inability to ascertain
prices due to the advertisement ban." This consideration distinguished
Virginia State Board from Patterson Drug Co. v. Kingery,45 an earlier
attack by pharmacists46 on the constitutionality of the Virginia stat-
ute. 47 As sellers, plaintiffs in Patterson asserted a prima facie commer-
cial concern, whereas the Virginia State Board consumers asserted an
interest in their own health that was "fundamentally deeper than a
trade consideration. '48
In addition, the Court recognized that since consumers in a free
enterprise economy must make numerous commercial choices daily,
society in general has an interest in being well informed about commer-
cial information. Intelligent economic decisions require access to such
information.49 "To this end," the Court concluded, "the free flow of
commercial information is indispensable." 50
The Court did not, however, foreclose all state regulation of drug
43. The Court first determined that plaintiff-appellees had standing to assert their
claim based upon a first amendment right to receive information. "[W]here a willing
speaker exists . . . the protection is afforded to the communication, to its source and its
recipients both." 425 U.S. at 756. See note 16 and accompanying text supra. In dissent,
Justice Rehnquist argued that the Court overextended the standing doctrine. He
reasoned that the plaintiffs-appellees did not assert their right to receive the information
but rather the right of some third party to publish. The statute in question placed only a
prohibition on the pharmacists to advertise and did not forbid anyone from receiving the
information either in person or by phone. Id. at 781-83.
44. The facts indicated that drug prices vary strikingly from pharmacy to pharmacy
and the consumers with the greatest need could afford them the least. In addition, they
were the people who had limited access, because of age or disability, to channels of
communication other than advertising. 425 U.S. at 754 n. 11, 763-64 n. 18.
45. 305 F. Supp. 821 (W.D. Va. 1969).
46. In Patterson a drug company and one of its pharmacists contended that the
prohibition on prescription drug price advertising violated the first amendment, the due
process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment, and the interstate
commerce clause. Id. at 823. For a discussion of the due process issue see notes 39, 40
and accompanying text supra.
47. VA. CODE § 54.426.1 (Supp. 1968) (repealed 1970). The relevant text of this statute
was similar to VA. CODE § 54-524.35 (1974). See note 15 supra.
48. 425 U.S. at 755. The district court relied on this distinction, 373 F. Supp. at
685-86. The Supreme Court accepted the district court's analysis and expanded upon it.
49. 425 U.S. at 764-65. See also FTC v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 603
(1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); Redish, supra note 8, at 472.
50. 425 U.S. at 765. See also A.MEIKELJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITs RELATION TO
SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948).
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price advertising. False, misleading or illegal advertising remain sub-
ject to state control. 51 In dissent, Justice Rehnquist argued that if these
are the sole limitations on permissible state regulation of price adver-
tising, fee advertising by physicians and attorneys would be the logical
consequence of the Court's position. 52 The majority rejected that pos-
sibility. In a final footnote, the Court stated that it expressed no
opinion as to other professions, 53 but noted that distinctions among
professions may require the examination of different factors. 54
Notwithstanding the Court's carefully limited holding, 55 consumer
activists may justifiably consider a first amendment approach as the
basis for future judicial intervention to invalidate state prohibitions
against other professional advertising. 56 If the public has a right to
know drug prices, arguably the right may extend to legal or medical
prices. 57 Assuming that a legal or medical advertisement is not false,
misleading or illegal, it should not be prohibited under the first amend-
51. 425 U.S. at 770-73. The Court also stated that reasonable restrictions concerning
time, place and manner were permissible. But total prohibition under the Virginia statute
exceeded reasonable limitations. Id. at 771. In a concurring opinion, Justice Stewart
argued that the Court's decision should not preclude state and federal regulation of false
or deceptive advertising since such regulation aids informed economic decisions by
ensuring accurate information. Id. at 780-81.
52. Id. at 785.
53. Id. at 773 n.25. The parties agreed that pharmacy is a profession. Id. at 750 n.3.
54. Id. at 773 n.25. In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Burger emphasized the
sharp distinctions between the professional judgments in the legal and medical profes-
sions and the lack of professional judgment on the part of pharmacists in selling
pre-packaged prescription drugs. Id. at 773-75.
55. See note 37 and accompanying text supra.
56. Terminal-Hudson Elec. Inc. v. Department of Consumer Affairs, 407 F. Supp.
1075 (C.D. Cal), vacated and remanded sub nom. Board of Optometry v. California
Citizens Action Group, 96 S. Ct. 2619 (1976) (state statute prohibiting the advertising of
prices and places to buy corrective eyeglasses infringed consumers' first amendment
right to receive such information). Cf. Terry v. California State Bd. of Pharmacy, 395 F.
Supp. 94 (N.D. Cal. 1975), aff'd, 96 S. Ct. 2617 (1976) (California statute prohibiting
pharmacists from advertising prescription drug prices infringed consumers' right to
access of such information).
57. Justice Rehnquist suggested that "the public's right to know the price of drugs
and its right to know the price of title searches or physical examinations" cannot be
distinguished. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 785 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
The Court's rationale may be extended to the medical profession. The Court indicated
that the need for consumer access to commercial price information may outweigh a
state's interest in suppressing it. An intelligent choice in the commercial market requires
ready access to price information. If the drug price ban harms the public, and if the
interest in knowing how much tetracycline costs is a protected interest, then the potential
harm in not knowing, and the public interest with respect to how much the prescribing
physician will charge, is that much stronger.
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ment rationale of the Virginia State Board decision.58
Several factors, however, distinguish bans on prescription drug
price advertising from other professional advertising restrictions.
Pharmacists, in the dispensing of prepackaged prescription drugs, act
as retailers, mere traders in commodities,59 whereas other profession-
als, such as attorneys and physicians, in rendering services, exercise
professional judgement.60 In addition, different ethical considerations
arise in professional-client relationships which are not present in a
commercial transaction. 61 Finally, there is a potential for professionals
who render services to engage in advertising intended to mislead the
public as to the nature of the services rendered. This potential does not
apply to pharmacists since their advertising would consist of listing
58. The Court's statement of the nature of the question as an offer of X drug for Y
price appears to reduce the issue to its most simplistic form. See note 37 supra. Given
this approach, there seems to be no reason why a physician could not advertise that he
will provide a patient with a chest x-ray for $25. Assuming that the physician does, in
fact, charge the stated price, the advertisement is not false or misleading. Unless a chest
x-ray is found to be illegal, the rationale of Virginia State Board does not prohibit its
publication.
59. The national market statistics indicate that 95% of all prescriptions are filled by
selling pre-manufactured and pre-packaged dosage forms of prescribed drugs. Brief for
Appellees at 29, Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976). See Maryland Bd. of Pharmacy v. Say-A-Lot, Inc., 270 Md
103, 114-15, 311 A.2d 242, 249 (1973) (pharmacy is rapidly evolving into almost exclu-
sively a retail business); 37 BROOKLYN L. REV. 617, 623-24 (1971). But see Supermarkets
Gen. Corp. v. Sills, 93 N.J. Super. 326, 338, 225 A.2d 728, 735 (Ch. 1966).
60. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 774 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (Professional judgment component is a large
part of the services rendered by physicians and attorneys); Williamson v. Lee Optical
Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (The sale of eyeglasses may require professional judgment with
regard to the prescription for the lenses and, therefore, state legislation is permissible.);
Semler v. Oregon State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608 (1935) (practice of
dentistry concerns treatment of bodily ills and requires standards of conduct different
from those traditional in market place competition).
61. In Semler v. Oregon State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608 (1935), the
Supreme Court upheld a statute prohibiting dentists from advertising their prices. In the
opinion, the Court reviewed the ethical considerations concerning professionals that
treat bodily ills:
The community is concerned with the maintenance of professional standards which
will insure not only competency in individual practitioners, but protection against
those who would prey upon a public peculiarly susceptible to imposition through
alluring promises of physical relief. And the community is concerned in providing
safeguards not only against deception, but against practices which would tend to
demoralize the profession by forcing its members into an unseemly rivalry which
would enlarge the opportunities of the least scrupulous.
Id. at 612.
For a similar view with respect to other "service" professions, see Cohen v. Hurley,
366 U.S. 117, 124 (1961) (attorneys); United States v. Oregon State Medical Soc'y, 343
U.S. 326, 336 (1952) (physicians).
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definite prices and quantities and would not be a description of the
quality of services. 62
Thus, although consumer access to price information is now a recog-
nized first amendment concern, in future cases the balance of interests
will not necessarily weigh in favor of the consumer. Given differences
between pharmacists and professionals who render more personal
services, a state may assert a significant interest in maintaining high
standards for service professions. 63 Court decisions upholding state
prohibitions on price advertisements by dentists, 64 optometrists 65 and
attorneys' have supported this view. With respect to pharmacists,
62. Semler v. Oregon State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608 (1935); Stadnik v.
Shell's City, Inc., 140 So. 2d 871 (Fla. 1962); Maryland Bd. of Pharmacy v. Say-A-Lot,
Inc., 270 Md. 103, 311 A.2d 242 (1973); Supermarkets Gen. Corp. v. Sills, 93 N.J. Super
326, 225 A.2d 728 (Ch. 1966); Pennsylvania State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Pastor, 441 Pa. 186,
272 A.2d 487 (1971). See generally 37 BROOKLYN L. REV. 617 (1971).
In Semler, the policy of the statute prohibiting dentists from price advertising was, in
part, to prevent the less ethical practitioners from resorting to advertising methods -to
lure the credulous and ignorant members of the public to their offices for the purpose of
fleecing them." The legislation aimed to prevent dentists from inducing patronage by
representations of painless dentistry, professional superiority and guaranteed dental
work. 294 U.S. at 612.
63. See notes 59-62 and accompanying text supra. With respect to the regulation of
fee advertising by attorneys, the Code of Professional Responsibility of the American
Bar Association offers an explanation of the state interests involved.
Competitive advertising would encourage extravagant artful, self-laudatory brash-
ness, in seeking business and thus could mislead the layman. Furthermore, it would
inevitably produce unrealistic expectations in particular cases and bring about
distrust of the law and lawyers. Thus, public confidence in our legal system would
be impaired by . . . advertisements of professional services. The attorney-client
relationship is personal and unique and should not be established as the result of
pressures and deceptions. History has demonstrated that public confidence in the
legal system is best preserved by strict, self-imposed controls over, rather than by
unlimited, advertising.
ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY No. 2, EC 2-9 (1971). But see Wilson,
Madison Avenue, Meet the Bar, 61 A.B.A.J. 586 (1975). The author argues that it is time
to amend the Code of Professional Responsibility and lift the ban on advertising. To
protect against advertisements that are in poor taste or unethical, sanctions could be
imposed: "[S]ome of the fragile niceties of the lawyer-client relationship of days gone by
may be lost. But far more would be gained, by legal needs met, by many new millions."
Id. at 588.
64. Semler v. Oregon State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608 (1935); Bashford
v. Department of Registration & Educ., 390 Ill. 601, 62 N.E.2d 462 (1945); Levine v.
State Bd. of Registration & Examination in Dentistry, 121 N.J.L. 193, 1 A.2d 876 (Sup.
Ct. 1938); Goe v. Gifford, 168 Va. 497, 191 S.E. 783 (1937).
65. Head v. New Mexico Bd. of Examiners, 374 U.S. 424 (1963); Williamson v. Lee
Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); State v. Rones, 223 La. 839, 67 So.2d 99 (1953);
Abelson's Inc. v. New Jersey State Bd. of Optometrists, 5 N.J. 412, 75 A.2d 867 (1950).
66. In re Bates, - Ariz. -, 555 P.2d 640, prob. juris. noted sub nom. Bates v.
Arizona State Bar, 97 S. Ct. 53 (1976) (court disciplinary rule prohibiting advertising by
attorneys does not violate first amendment). Support for state regulation of competitive
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other regulations, including education and licensing requirements, 67 are
sufficient to protect the state interest.
In affirming the consumer's constitutional right to know the prices
of prescription drugs, Virginia State Board has eliminated the remain-
ing vestiges of the commercial speech doctrine. Equally important, the
decision recognized the applicability of the first amendment as a con-
sumer tool to obtain access to information of general public interest.
The narrow scope of the decision, however, should not be overlooked.
In Virginia State Board, the consumers sought only price information
for standardized goods in a highly regulated industry. Arguably if they
sought information about the quality of the prescription drugs or prices
of nonstandardized services, the state's regulatory interest would have
prevailed. How far the courts will extend the free flow of information
to the consumer awaits future consideration. What will be crucial are
the limits courts will attach to the definition of information of general
public interest.
Marsha A. Miller
practices of attorneys appears in dictum in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773
(1975), which held that a minimum-fee schedule for title examinations published by the
County Bar Association and enforced by Virginia State Bar violated § 1 of the Sherman
Act. The Court recognized that the state has a compelling interest in regulating the
practice of law. This regulatory power extends to usual forms of business competition
that contravenes the profession's ethical standards. Id. at 792.
67. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 768-69 (1976). In Virginia, as in other states, the practice of pharmacy is highly
regulated. VA. CODE § 54-524.21 (1974) provides, in part, for education and experience
requirements. The applicant for a license must pass the examination prescribed by the
Board of Pharmacy. Pharmacists are subject to fine, suspension or license revocation for
specified acts. Id. § 54-524.22:1. The Court in Virginia State Board felt that these
regulations were sufficient to protect the state's interest in promoting public health.
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